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To assess the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), it is necessary to evaluate whether WTO members promptly take 
the actions required to bring themselves into compliance with their WTO obligations, as 
those obligations have been defined or clarified in the dispute settlement reports issued 
by WTO panels and the Appellate Body. In this paper, the operation of the WTO dispute 
settlement system is briefly outlined, with particular emphasis on the overall time taken 
by the various stages. This is followed by an analysis of the implementation record for 
disputes brought under the WTO – both overall and on a member-by-member and 
agreement-by-agreement basis, with consideration of the types and disputes that have 
proved problematic. The conclusion of this paper is as follows: while overall record of 
implementation is relatively good, there are problem areas. Those problems could be 
mitigated with the modification of remedies provided for in the WTO dispute settlement 
so that (i) money payments could be substituted for the right to suspend concessions; (ii) 
such payments or suspension of concessions could be calculated on a retrospective basis; 
and (iii) such payments or suspension of concessions could be increased periodically over 
time in the event of continued non-implementation. 
 
 
Key words: World Trade Organization, dispute settlement, suspension of concessions 
 
 
JEL classification: F13, K33 
 
                                                 
* Edwin M. Adams Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Professor Davey was Director 
of the WTO’s Legal Affairs Division from 1995-1999. In late 2004, RIETI asked Professor Davey to write 
this paper as an introduction to the issue of implementation of panel/Appellate Body rulings and 
recommendations in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The Japanese translation of this paper will be 
included in a volume currently being compiled and edited by RIETI faculty fellow Tsuyoshi Kawase and 
Co-editor Ichiro Ararki, to be published by Sanseido, Tokyo as part of the RIETI policy analysis series in 




  To assess the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), it is necessary to evaluate whether WTO members promptly take 
the actions required to bring themselves into compliance with their WTO obligations, as 
those obligations have been defined or clarified in the dispute settlement reports issued 
by WTO panels and the Appellate Body.  In this introduction to this issue of 
implementation in WTO dispute settlement, I first outline briefly the operation of the 
WTO dispute settlement system, with particular emphasis on the overall time taken by 
the various stages.  I then consider the implementation record for disputes brought under 
the WTO – both overall and on a member-by-member and agreement-by-agreement basis, 
with consideration of the types of disputes that have proved to be problematic.  I 
conclude with some thoughts on how the implementation record might be improved. 
 
I.  THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 
An effective dispute settlement system is critical to the operation of the World 
Trade Organization.  It would make little sense to spend years negotiating detailed rules 
in international trade agreements if those rules could be ignored.  Therefore, a system of 
rule enforcement is necessary.  In the WTO that function is performed by the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (the "DSU").  As stated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, "[t]he 
dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system".   There are four phases to dispute 
settlement: consultations, the panel process, the appeal and the surveillance of 
implementation. 
 
  Under the procedures of the WTO dispute settlement system, the first step in the 
process is consultations.
1  A WTO member may ask for consultations with another WTO 
member if the complaining member believes that the other member has violated a WTO 
agreement or otherwise nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it.  The goal of the 
consultation stage is to enable the disputing parties to understand better the factual 
situation and the legal claims in respect of the dispute and to resolve the matter without 
further proceedings. 
 
  If consultations fail to resolve the dispute within 60 days of the request for 
consultations, the complaining WTO member may request the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body,
2  which is composed of all WTO members, to establish a panel to rule on the 
dispute.
3  Pursuant to the DSU, if requested, the DSB is required to establish a panel no 
later than the second meeting at which the request for a panel appears on the agenda, 
unless there is a consensus in the DSB to the contrary.
4   Thus, unless the member 
requesting the establishment of a panel consents to delay, a panel will be established 
                                                 
1 DSU, art. 4. 
2 For the operation of the DSB, see DSU, art. 2. 
3 DSU, art. 4.7. 
4 DSU, art. 6.1.   - 2 -
within approximately 90 days of the initial request for consultations.  In fact, most 
complainants do not push their cases forward that quickly. 
 
  After the panel is established by the DSB, it is necessary to select the three 
individuals who will serve as panelists.
5  If the parties cannot agree on the identity of the 
panelists within 20 days of the panel's establishment, any party to the dispute may request 
the WTO Director-General to appoint the panel.
6  In fact, this has become the norm over 
time.  Typically, panelists are current or former government trade officials, although 
academics and practitioners sometimes are selected to serve as panelists.  Although an 
insistent complainant can ensure the composition of a panel within 30 days of its 
establishment, panel composition takes more time in almost all cases.         
 
  Panels normally meet twice with the parties to discuss the substantive issues in 
the case.
7   Each meeting is preceded by the filing of written submissions.  After 
completing the fact-gathering and argument phase, the panel issues its "interim report", 
which contains its findings and recommendations.  Parties are allowed to, and almost 
always do, comment on some aspects of the interim report.  In light of the comments 
received, the panel then issues its final report.  The DSU provides that a panel’s final 
report is to be circulated to WTO members within nine months of the panel’s 
establishment,
8 although on average panels take 12-13 months, which means that some 
cases take much longer.  The final report is referred to the DSB for formal adoption, 
which is to take place within 60 days unless there is a consensus not to adopt the report or 
an appeal of the report to the WTO Appellate Body.
9  This so-called negative consensus 
rule is a fundamental change from the GATT dispute settlement system where a positive 
consensus was needed to adopt a panel report, thus permitting a dissatisfied losing party 
to block any action on the report.  Now, as long as one member wants the report adopted, 
it will be adopted.  
 
  The majority of panel reports are in fact appealed.  The appeal is to the WTO 
Appellate Body, which consists of seven individuals, appointed by the DSB for four-year 
terms.
10   The Appellate Body hears appeals of panel reports in divisions of three, 
although its rules provide for the division hearing a case to exchange views with the other 
four Appellate Body members before the division finalizes its report.  The Appellate 
Body is required to issue its report within 60 (at most 90) days from the date of the 
appeal,
11  and its report is to be adopted automatically by the DSB within 30 days,
12 
absent consensus to the contrary.  Appellate Body reports have almost always met the 90-
day deadline. 
 
                                                 
5 On panelists generally, see DSU, art. 8. 
6 DSU, art. 8.7. 
7 On panel procedures, see DSU, arts. 11-12 & Appendix 3. 
8 DSU, art. 12.9. 
9 DSU, art. 16.4. 
10 On the Appellate Body, see DSU, art. 17. 
11 DSU, art. 17.5. 
12 DSU, art. 17.14.   - 3 -
  The final phase of the WTO dispute settlement process is the surveillance of 
implementation stage.
13  This is designed to ensure that DSB recommendations (based on 
adopted panel/Appellate Body reports) are implemented.  If a panel finds that an 
agreement has been violated, it typically recommends that the defaulting WTO member 
concerned bring the offending measure into conforming with its WTO obligations.
14  
While panels may suggest ways of implementation, they seldom do.  In any event, it is 
ultimately left to the WTO member to determine how to implement. 
 
  The DSU expressly provides that “prompt compliance with recommendations or 
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the 
benefit of all [WTO] Members”.
15 Under the DSB’s surveillance function, the defaulting 
member is required to state its intentions with respect to implementation within 30 days 
of the adoption of the applicable report(s) by the DSB.
16   While members virtually 
always express their intention to implement, they typically indicate that immediate 
implementation is impractical, which means under the DSU that they are to be afforded a 
reasonable period of time for implementation.
17  Absent agreement, that period of time 
may be set by arbitration, and the DSU provides that, as a guideline for the arbitrator, the 
period should not exceed 15 months.
18  Overall, in non-export subsidy cases, the median 
reasonable period of time has been around 8 to 9 months.   
 
  If a party fails to implement the report within the reasonable period of time, the 
prevailing party may request compensation.  If that is not forthcoming within 20 days of 
the expiration of the reasonable period of time,
19 it may request the DSB, within 30 days 
of said expiration, to authorize it to suspend concessions owed to the non-implementing 
party (i.e. take retaliatory action).
20  DSB authorization is automatic, absent consensus to 
the contrary, subject to arbitration of the level of suspension if requested by the non-
implementing member.
21  Suspension of concession is said to be only temporary and is to 
be applied only until the inconsistency of the measure is removed.
22 
 
  Under the timeframes described above, one would anticipate that a diligent 
complainant could obtain the removal of an inconsistent measure within about 26 months 
of its request for consultations.
23   In fact, as noted above, the minimum specified 
timeframes are typically exceeded, particularly in the consultation, panel establishment 
and panel report stages.  As a consequence, in those cases where the initial reasonable 
                                                 
13 See generally, DSU, art. 21. 
14 DSU, art. 19.1. 
15 DSU, art. 21.1. 
16 DSU, art. 21.3. 
17 DSU, art. 21.3. 
18 DSU, art. 21.3(c). 
19 See DSU, art. 22.2. 
20 DSU, art. 22.6. 
21 DSU, art. 22.7. 
22 DSU, art. 22.8. 
23 This timeframe is approximate and was constructed as follows: consultations (60 days – 2 months); panel 
establishment (30 days – 1 month); panel report (9 months); appeal (45 days – 1.5 months); appellate report 
(90 days – 3 months); adoption (15 days – 0.5 month); and reasonable period of time (9 months), for a total 
of 26 months, or two years and two months.     - 4 -
period of time for implementation had expired as of December 2004, the median time 
from the request for consultations to implementation was 34 months (Table 1), or eight 
months (30%) longer than the period foreseen in the DSU.  Of course, the figure of 34 
months is only a median time.  By definition, half the cases have taken longer, some 
much longer, to resolve.  Given the goal of dispute settlement as set out at the beginning 
of this part – security and predictability in trading relations – it is obvious that the DSU is 
failing to ensure that goal is met in too many cases.  It is true that some of the delay can 
be attributed to complainants’ failure to prosecute their cases vigorously to the extent 
allowed by the DSU.  Nonetheless, the data in the tables suggests that a significant part of 
the problem is the failure to ensure prompt implementation.  I now turn to the WTO’s 
record in that regard. 
 
II.  THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
In order to assess the overall record of implementation in WTO dispute settlement, 
it is useful to start with the adopted WTO reports where implementation was due as of 31 
December 2004 and to consider – on a respondent-by-respondent and on an agreement-
by-agreement basis – to what extent (i) the reports were implemented without significant 
delay in a manner more or less accepted by the complainant; (ii) the reports were 
implemented only after significant delay; (iii) the issue of implementation was disputed 
as of 31 December 2004; and (iv) the reports were admittedly not implemented as 
required as of 31 December 2004.  In some situations, as explained below, it is difficult 
to categorize specific cases, but a tentative classification can be found in Table 2. 
 
  One of the most striking features of the information contained in the tables is that 
only 16 WTO members have been found to have violated WTO rules.  Of the 61 cases
24 
where implementation was originally due as of 31 December 2005, 23 cases (roughly 
38%) involve the United States, with Argentina, Canada and the EU each being involved 
in 6 cases (about 10% each).  The 12 members involved in remaining one-third of the 
cases are Australia (2 cases), Brazil (1), Chile (2), Egypt (1), Guatemala (1), India (3), 
Indonesia (1), Japan (3), Korea (3), Mexico (1), Thailand (1) and Turkey (1).  I will 
examine each member’s record in turn. 
 
A.  The Implementation Record of WTO Members 
 
1. United  States 
 
                                                 
24 I have counted certain related cases as one case.  In three instances there was only one Appellate Body 
report issued, notwithstanding the issuance of more than one panel report (EC Bananas, EC Hormones, US 
1916 Act).  In three other instances, I have treated cases with multiple panel reports as one notwithstanding 
the independence of the panel reports.  These instances include the two Mexican challenges to the 
Guatemalan antidumping duties on cement; the two Brazilian challenges to Canadian aircraft subsidies and 
the two Canadian cases involving US countervailing duties on lumber.  In the tables and footnotes, I have 
used short names for the cases.  I have included in Table 1 the DS number along with each short name, 
which will enable readers to find easily more information about the case in question on the WTO website.  
The data in the tables is organized on a country-by-country basis, with the most frequent violators listed 
first.   - 5 -
  The United States has been the prime target of cases pursued through the panel 
process in the WTO.  Although it is not the focus of this introduction, it is interesting to 
speculate why this is so.  There would seem to be one easy explanation.  The US is a 
frequent user of safeguard and trade remedy measures and US administrations are not 
easily able to negotiate the removal of or changes in such measures.  Of the 23 cases 
involving the US, 17 of them are safeguard or trade remedy cases.   Of the remaining six 
cases, four of them involve the EC – one relating to the Bananas dispute and three that 
might be viewed as EC payback for the Bananas and Hormones disputes.
25 
 
  As indicated in Table 2, the US implemented 12 of the 23 cases without 
significant delay.  It is worth noting, however, that seven of those twelve cases involved 
safeguard measures and in four of them, the US simply allowed the measure to expire.
26  
Of the other five cases that the US implemented promptly, one involved an expired 




  Of the eleven cases where the US has not promptly implemented, they can 
usefully be divided into three categories – those where implementation has occurred but 
only after some delay; those where implementation is currently disputed and those that 
are admittedly not implemented.  There are three cases where implementation was 
delayed.  In Gasoline, one aspect of the regulation was changed within the reasonable 
period of time, but another aspect remained in effect for about four months after the 
expiration of the reasonable period of time.  In DRAMS, there was a dispute over 
implementation that was settled 11 months after the expiration of the reasonable period of 
time, but only after an Article 21.5 proceeding had been started by Korea.  In Steel CVD 
(Germany), implementation occurred within about 14 months, but since no reasonable 
period of time had been set, it is difficult to regard implementation as timely, since the 
average reasonable period of time for implementation is eight or nine months. 
 
  In four of the eleven cases, implementation appears to be disputed to some degree 
as of 31 December 2004.  Those cases include (i) the EC-12 steel privatization case 
where the EC has accepted implementation in eight of the included matters, but has 
initiated an Article 21.5 proceeding in respect of four others; (ii) the FSC case where the 
EC is challenging a transition provision in an Article 21.5 proceeding (although it 
                                                 
25 US Certain Products; US FSC; US Copyright; US Section 211. 
26 Three of the cases involved textile safeguards.  The measure in Underwear expired one month after the 
reports were adopted; the measure in Wool Shirts expired before adoption of the reports; and the measure 
in Cotton Yarn was revoked four days after the reports were adopted.  The other four cases involved regular 
safeguards.  The safeguard in Wheat Gluten expired as scheduled, as did the Line Pipe safeguard, although 
in Line Pipe, the complainant (Korea) received expanded quota access prior to expiration.  The Lamb 
safeguard was in force for 28 months.  Only the Steel safeguard was significantly truncated – remaining in 
force for only nineteen months instead of the original intended three-year period. 
27 US implementation in Shrimp was unsuccessfully challenged by Malaysia in an Article 21.5 action.  The 
measure in Lead CVD had been removed prior to adoption of the reports.  There was a significant reduction 
in the applicable duties in the Stainless AD case, which was essentially accepted by Korea as 
implementation.  India questioned in the DSB whether there had been full implementation in its Steel AD 
case against the US, but did not pursue the matter.  The US Certain Products case involved a measure that 
had expired prior to adoption of the relevant panel/Appellate Body reports.   - 6 -
otherwise accepts implementation); (iii) the 1916 Antidumping Act case, where Japan has 
indicated dissatisfaction because the repeal of the law was not made retroactive (although 
it may ultimately accept implementation); and (iv) the Lumber CVD case where Canada 
indicated in the December 2004 DSB meeting that it may not accept the implementation 
announced by the US in mid-December 2004.  If the US prevails in these four cases 
(either in the Article 21.5 proceedings or because the complaining party decides to accept 
US action as implementation), there would have been timely implementation in the EC-
12 and Lumber CVD cases, but not in the other two.  In such circumstances, 
implementation in FSC would have been 49 months and implementation in the 1916 Act 
case would have been 39 months after the original reasonable period of time had expired. 
 
  Of the remaining four cases – where there has not been full implementation – one 
involves the Byrd Amendment, where the original reasonable period of time expired on 
27 December 2003 and where a number of countries have recently been authorized to 
take retaliatory action against the US.
28  The other three cases are in a somewhat odd 
position.  Implementation did not occur within the reasonable period of time as originally 
set, but there have been extensions of the reasonable period of time in two cases (Steel 
AD (Japan) and Section 211) and a compensation arrangement in the other (Copyright).  
Thus, one could argue that as of the end of 2004, the US was not technically out of 




  Generally speaking, US administrations under Presidents Clinton and Bush have 
always implemented adverse WTO decisions more or less within the reasonable period of 
time when they could do so through administrative action.  In some cases, questions 
about US administrative implementation have resulted in Article 21.5 proceedings 
(Shrimp, DRAMS, EC-12, and potentially Lumber CVD), but ultimately to date there has 
been implementation found in the 21.5 proceeding or the complaining party has not 
chosen to challenge implementation.  The problems with US implementation have 
occurred when congressional action has been required.  The four cases where 
implementation is long overdue – Byrd, Section 211, Copyright and Japan Steel – all 
require statutory changes for implementation.  Until the last few months of 2004, the FSC 
and 1916 Act cases were also in this category.  While there are transitional issues in both 
of those cases, it is a positive development that Congress has for the first time basically 
implemented adverse WTO decisions.   
 
                                                 
28 Eight of the complainants in the Byrd case (Brazil, Canada, Chile, EC, India, Japan, Korea and Mexico) 
have been authorized to suspend concessions.  The other three complainants (Australia, Indonesia and 
Thailand) agreed to extend the reasonable period of time to 27 December 2004. 
29 In Japan Steel the original reasonable period of time expired as of 23 November 2002, but it has been 
extended, most recently to July 2005.  In that case, the US has partially implemented; a change in the 
relevant statute is required to complete implementation.  In Section 211, the original reasonable period of 
time expired as of 31 December 2002, but it has been extended to 31 December 2004.  In Copyright, the 
original reasonable period of time expired as of 27 July 2001, but it was extended and subsequently there 
was a settlement under which the US paid compensation to the EC that was viewed as settling the matter 
through 31 December 2004.  Thus, implementation in these three cases, when it does occur, will be long 
after the expiration of the originally set reasonable period of time.   - 7 -
2. Argentina 
 
  Somewhat surprisingly (to me), Argentina has been found to have violated WTO 
rules more often (along with Canada and the EC) than any country other than the United 
States.  So far, Argentina has implemented the WTO decisions against it, usually within 
the reasonable period of time.  There have been, however, some complaints about 
Argentine implementation.  For example, there was some delay (five months) in 
implementation of the first case against it (Textiles) and the next case against it 
(Footwear) involved a safeguard protecting products that were also involved in first case.  
In addition, the EC has claimed that there has been inadequate implementation of the 
Hides case, although it has chosen not to pursue the matter it light of its view that 




  Canada has been the subject of six adverse panel reports.  In four of the cases, it 
implemented the reports within the reasonable period of time.
30  In one case – Dairy – its 
initial implementation was challenged successfully in an Article 21.5 proceeding, 
following which Canada took action that was acceptable to the complaints (the United 
States and New Zealand).  The settlement occurred 28 months after expiration of the 
reasonable period of time.  The sixth case – involving a Brazilian challenge to Canada’s 
subsidization of its regional aircraft industry – has not been implemented.  It is closely 
related to a Canadian challenge of Brazilian subsidies to the same industry that has also 
not been implemented.  Both sides have been authorized to take retaliatory action, 
although neither has done so to date.  Press reports indicate that negotiations to resolve 
that matter are occasionally held, but have not succeeded to date. 
 
4. European  Communities 
 
  The EC has been on the losing end of six cases.
31  In three cases, it implemented 
the reports more or less within the applicable reasonable period of time.
32  In two cases, 
the EC implemented the reports (or agreed to do so) only after Article 21.5 proceedings. 
Those cases include Bananas – in which the initial EC implementation was found to be 
defective and in respect of which the EC has agreed to implement a new system in 2006 – 
and Bed Linen.
33  In the sixth case – Hormones – implementation was originally due 13 
May 1999.  The EC claims that it implemented as 14 October 2003 and has challenged in 
                                                 
30 Periodicals, Patents, Autos, Patent Term. 
31 The EC also settled two cases after issuance of interim reports that were reportedly unfavorable to its 
position – Scallops and Butter.   
32 In two of the cases – Poultry and Malleable Tubes – the complainant (Brazil) indicated concerns about 
implementation in DSB meetings, but it did not pursue those concerns in either case.  Implementation was 
accepted in the third case, which involved sardine labeling. 
33 In Bananas, the settlement occurred in April 2001, 28 months after expiration of the original period of 
time, which was set at 31 December 1998.  In Bed Linen, the original reasonable period of time expired on 
14 August 2001 and implementation occurred on 21 December 2003, when the measure was removed, or 
28 months later.   - 8 -






  Japan has been required to implement three adverse panel reports.  The first report, 
which involved discriminatory taxes on alcoholic beverages, was implemented for the 
most part within the reasonable period of time and compensation was provided in respect 
of the aspect of implementation that was delayed.  The other two cases both involved 
sanitary regulations for fruit.  Japan implemented the first case only after some delay.  
The reasonable period of time for implementation expired as of 31 December 1999, but 
the matter was settled only as of 23 August 2001, some 20 months later.  The second case 




Australia has lost two cases – Salmon and Automotive Leather.  In each case, 
Australia implemented only after its initial implementation measure was found to be 
unsatisfactory in an Article 21.5 proceeding.  Thus, in Salmon, implementation was due 
as of 6 July 1998, but did not occur until 16 May 2000.  In Automotive Leather, the 
original reasonable period of time expired as of 14 September 1999, but did not occur 
until 24 July 2000. 
 
As noted above, Brazil lost a case brought by Canada against its regional aircraft 
subsidies and it has not implemented the decision. 
 
Chile has been on the losing end in two cases – Alcohol Taxes and Price Band.  It 
took action to implement both decisions within the reasonable period of time.  Argentina, 
the complainant in Price Band, has objected to whether that decision was in fact 
implemented, but it has taken no further action although one year has elapsed since Chile 
claimed to have implemented the decision. 
 
India has been on the losing end of three cases – Patents, Quantitative 
Restrictions and Autos.  In each case, it has implemented within the reasonable period of 
time.   
 
Korea has also been required to implement three adverse reports – Alcohol Taxes, 
Dairy and Beef – and has done so within the reasonable periods of time that were 
established.   
 
Mexico has lost one case, which involved antidumping duties on high fructose 
corn syrup.  It implemented the decision, but only after an Article 21.5 proceeding.   
Originally, implementation was due as 22 September 2000, but the duties were not 
revoked until May 2002. 
 
                                                 
34 WT/DS320 & 321.   - 9 -
Turkey lost a case by India challenging its textile quotas, which it had adopted as 
part of its implementation of the EC-Turkey Customs Union.  It implemented the 
decision to India’s satisfaction about four and one-half months after the reasonable period 
of time expired. 
 
Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia and  Thailand have each lost one case and 
implemented within the relevant reasonable period of time.  In the case of Egypt and 
Thailand, the complainants (Turkey and Poland, respectively) questioned whether there 
was complete implementation, but neither pursued the matter. 
 
7.  Summary of WTO Members’ Implementation Records 
 
  Overall, roughly 60% of panel reports requiring implementation have been 
implemented promptly – either within the original reasonable period of time for 
implementation or shortly thereafter.  In addition, another 20% have been implemented, 
albeit with significant delay (the average delay after the time set for implementation is 13 
months, as indicated in Table 3).  Of the remaining cases, six of them (10%) involve 
situations where there is a dispute over implementation.  In three of them, there will have 
been prompt implementation if the respondent prevails in a 21.5 proceeding;
35 while the 
other three cases will in any event involve significantly delayed implementation even if 
the most recent measure is found to be WTO consistent.
36  As to the remaining six cases 
(10%), where non-implementation is admitted, it is unclear when they will be 
implemented.   
 
  As indicated in Table 3, non-implementation is primarily a problem of the United 
States (four of six cases) and delayed implementation is primarily a problem of the Quad 
(the US, the EC, Japan and Canada) and Australia (12 of 15 cases).
37   Developing 
countries have usually implemented within the original reasonable period of time (81%) 
or within five months thereafter (9%).  Only once has a developing country been the 
subject of an Article 21.5 proceeding (Mexico HFCS) and only in one case is non-
implementation by a developing country a long-standing problem (Brazil Air).  This 
means that any solution attempting to address the problems of non-implementation and 
delayed implementation must deal effectively with foot-dragging by the Quad countries. 
 
B.  The Implementation Record Under the Different WTO Agreements 
 
It appears that the implementation record varies significantly depending on the 
WTO agreement at issue.  As Table 4 indicates, there are no implementation problems 
with safeguard cases, of which there have been 10.  Of course, the time taken to attack a 
safeguard in the WTO allows it to exist long enough so that it probably serves its purpose 
before its removal is required.  Nonetheless, safeguards have been promptly removed 
                                                 
35 The three cases are the US EC-12 case, the Japan Apples case and the US Lumber CVD case. 
36 The three cases are EC Hormones (53 months); US FSC (49 months); US 1916 Act (39 months). 
37 I have included the three cases (EC Hormones, US FSC and US 1916 Act) where implementation is now 
disputed, but where it is clear that implementation occurred only long after the expiration of the reasonable 
period of time.   - 10 -
when found to be in violation of WTO rules.  It is also interesting that GATT cases, of 
which there have been 18, have also generally not presented implementation problems.  
As indicated in Table 4, 12 of the 16 GATT cases were promptly implemented and of the 
four that were not, only EC Bananas was significantly delayed, as the other three cases 
were implemented within 5 months of the expiration of the reasonable period of time.   
 
In terms of the implementation record under the various WTO agreements, there 
have been three particular problem areas.  Probably the most difficult area has involved 
subsidies.  Of the four cases, two have not been implemented at all (the Canada/Brazil 
regional aircraft subsidies dispute), one has been implemented prospectively after long 
delay (US FSC – 49 months after the expiration of the original reasonable period of time) 
and one was implemented after 10 months’ delay (Australia Leather).  The one subsidies 
case under the Agreement on Agriculture – Canada Dairy – also took a long time to 
implement (28 months after expiration of the reasonable period of time).
38   Thus, of the 
five subsidies cases, two remain unimplemented and the other three took years, on 
average, to be implemented. 
 
SPS cases have also proved to be difficult in respect of implementation.  As of the 
end of 2004, two cases are in subsequent panel proceedings (EC Hormones and Japan 
Apples).  Even if found to be WTO-consistent now, EC implementation in Hormones 
occurred some 59 months after expiration of the reasonable period of time – a period 
explained in part by the need for it to undertake new scientific studies and in part by the 
its complex legislative procedures.  The two cases where implementation has been 
accepted took a long time to implement following expiration of the set reasonable period 
of time (Australia Salmon – 23 months and Japan Agricultural Products – 20 months). 
 
There have also been problems with implementation in the trade remedies area, 
although to a large extent, the implementation problems in this area mainly concern the 
United States.  In three of the seven cases involving the US, the problem is or was the 
need for congressional action (1916 Act, Byrd, Steel AD – Japan); and in two of the cases, 
implementation is only contested and may still be upheld or accepted (EC-12 and Lumber 
CVD).  In the other two US cases, the delay was not all that great (DRAMS and Steel 
CVD – Germany).
39   It should be underlined, of course, that the total time taken to 
challenge a national trade remedy measure in WTO dispute settlement – from 
consultation request to implementation deadline, combined with the fact that 
implementation may often be accomplished by a revision (as opposed to the elimination) 
of the challenged measure, means that the WTO dispute settlement system may not 
provide a particularly effective means of mitigating the trade impact of trade remedy 
measures. 
 
                                                 
38 The other two cases under the Agriculture Agreement were implemented within the reasonable period of 
time. 
39 The only other case in this category is EC Bed Linen.   - 11 -
Finally, it should be mentioned that the three non-US cases involving the TRIPS 
Agreement have been implemented promptly,
40  but the two US cases, which require 
congressional action to revise statutory provisions, have not been implemented.
41 
 
Based on the foregoing, it would appear that the problem WTO agreements for 
implementation of dispute settlement results are the Subsidies and SPS Agreements.  In 
the case of subsidies, the problem may be that an industry that is able to obtain 
governmental subsidies in the first place (whether through political power or by 
convincing the government that the national interest justify the subsidies) is likely to be 
able to delay implementation.  In the case of the SPS Agreement, it would appear that 
public concerns over food safety and the impact of those concerns on politicians has been 
a significant problem that has delayed implementation in SPS cases.  In addition, the fact 
that one of the subsidy cases and all of the SPS cases involve agricultural products – an 
area that is new to international oversight – may be an additional complicating factor in 
slowing implementation.  In any event, any attempt to improve the implementation record 
at the WTO must take account of these apparent problem areas.  In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that the overall time taken for safeguards and trade remedy cases may mean 
that even prompt implementation, typically by removal or revision of the contested 
measure, will not control improper use of safeguard and trade remedy measures.  Thus, 
other remedies may need to be considered. 
 
III.  POSSIBLE REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE WTO IMPLEMENTATION 
RECORD 
 
A. General  Considerations   
 
In considering how to improve the implementation record of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, it is necessary first to consider the current remedies for non-
implementation and how they are structured.  I believe that it is probably the case that the 
overall positive record of implementation in the WTO is due to the good faith desire of its 
members to see the dispute settlement system work effectively.  The more active users of 
the system are repeat players, and they appear as both complainants and respondents.  
Accordingly, it is in their overall interests that the system function effectively.  However, 
there will be cases where such good faith cannot be relied upon.  When a WTO member 
faces difficulty in implementation, the issue quickly becomes one of assessing the 
consequences of non-implementation.  That in turn requires a consideration of the nature 
and structure of the WTO’s remedies for non-compliance with DSB rulings and 
recommendations. 
 
In the event of non-implementation within the reasonable period of time provided, 
the DSU provides two potential remedies, both of which are said to be temporary ones 
                                                 
40 Canada Patents, Canada Patent Term and India Patents. 
41  US Copyright and Section 211.  As noted above, US Copyright was temporarily settled (until 31 
December 2004) by US payment of compensation and the reasonable period of time in Section 211 has 
been extended by two years to 31 December 2004.   - 12 -
pending implementation.
42   Those remedies are compensation and the suspension of 
concessions (often simply called “retaliation”).  To date, with one exception, 
compensation has not often been used, except to excuse compliance for a limited period 
of time.
43  The exception was US Copyright, where the US made a cash payment to the 
EC to excuse three years or so of non-compliance.  The period covered by the 
compensation ends as of 31 December 2004, and no extension has been announced as of 
this writing.  I will not give further consideration to compensation  as a remedy in this 
introduction.  Except for minor matters, the political problems that preclude 
implementation will probably also prevent reasonable compensation.  While the idea of 
“forced” compensation  has been raised,
44 there are obvious implementation problems in 
dealing with a member that is already not in compliance with its WTO obligations. 
 
The suspension of concessions is typically thought of as the basic remedy for non-
implementation of WTO dispute settlement results.  In fact, however, it has not often 
been used.  The GATT Contracting Parties authorized it only once
45 and  it  was 
supposedly never actually implemented.  In the WTO to date, suspension of concessions 
has been authorized and used only four times:  by the US in EC Bananas and EC 
H o r m o n e s ,  b y  C a n a d a  i n  E C  H o r m o n e s ,  a n d  b y  t h e  E C  i n  U S  F S C .   I t  h a s  b e e n  
authorized, but not yet used by Ecuador in EC Bananas, by Canada in Brazil Aircraft, and 
by Brazil in Canada Aircraft.  The level of suspension was arbitrated in US 1916 Act, but 
the EC never sought authority to suspend concessions.  Finally, in late 2004, eight 
members were authorized to suspend concessions in US Byrd, although they had not 
actually done so as of this writing.
46   
 
To understand the impact of an authorization to suspend concessions, it is 
important to recall that WTO remedies are prospective.  The level of suspension is 
calculated from the end of the reasonable period of time.  In addition, it is important to 
consider the two principal aims of suspension – to restore the balance of concessions that 
was upset when one member violated its obligations (a temporary aim since compliance 
is the preferred result); and to give that member an incentive to comply.
47  The current 
problem with achieving the first aim – rebalancing – is that if retaliation is authorized, 
rebalancing takes place at a lower level of trade liberalization that had been agreed to.  It 
would be desirable if a remedy could be devised that would not lead to less liberalization 
overall.  Moreover, retaliation harms the Member imposing the higher tariffs as well as 
the target of the retaliation.  
 
                                                 
42 DSU, art. 3.7. 
43 For example, this was the case in Japan Alcohol Taxes and US Line Pipe. 
44 Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO, 94 American Journal of International 
Law 335 (2000). 
45 William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham International Law Journal 51, 99 (1987). 
46 An DSU Article 25 arbitration determined the level of compensation paid by the US in the Copyright 
case mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
47  DSU Article 22.1.  European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6, WT/DS27/ARB, para. 
6.3 (9 April 1999).   - 13 -
  In respect of the second aim – incentive to comply – there are two issues – timing 
and level of compensation or retaliation.  At present, because remedies are prospective, 
there is an incentive initially to delay the time at which point they might be implemented, 
such as by seeking a long reasonable period of time for compliance and then forcing the 
complainant to go through an Article 21.5 panel (and Appellate Body) proceeding.   
Moreover, if the threat of retaliation does not work, it is possible that the actual existence 
of retaliation will become viewed as the status quo and a long-term solution, even though 
the WTO rules in theory require compliance.  This is a real possibility given that under 
the DSU the level of retaliation is to be equivalent to (i.e., is not to exceed) the level of 
nullification or impairment.
48   In other words, the offending member is not to be 
penalized for its non-implementation. 
 
  There is a more general problem with suspension of concessions.  While it seems 
to work when threatened by a large country against a smaller one, and has worked when 
implemented by one major power against another, it may not be an effective remedy for a 
small country (even if it can target sensitive large country sectors such as copyright 
holders).  Moreover, the EC Bananas and EC Hormones cases show that it is not always 
effective, at least not immediately, between major powers.  It should be noted, however, 
that retaliation by the EC against the US seemed to have a political effect in the FSC case 
that led to US implementation, even if the significance of the economic impact of the 
retaliation was not clear. In addition, the EC and others’ threat of retaliation seemed to 
work in the US Steel Safeguards case.  Nonetheless, occasional inefficacy of suspension 
of concessions and the unfavorable position in which it leaves developing countries may 




  These considerations lead to the obvious question of whether there are other 
remedies beyond compensation and retaliation that might be more effective in the WTO 
context.  One obvious possibility would be the payment of fines or damages.  One 
obvious problem would be the disparity in fine-paying ability among WTO members.  
The system would have to be designed to avoid the possibility that rich members could 
effectively buy their way out of obligations in a way not available to the poor members.  
That might be accomplished by tying the amount of fines to the size of the member’s 
economy, or otherwise provide for a sliding scale that would minimize “discrimination” 
against poor members.  While a system of fines or damages has not been discussed in 
much detail in the past, such provisions have been included in free trade agreements 
recently negotiated by the United States.
50  For example, under their provisions, after the 
level of suspension of concessions had been set, the non-complying country would have 
the option of paying an amount equal to one-half level of suspension in lieu of having the 
concessions suspended.  These provisions may suggest that the traditional government 
unwillingness to submit to the possibility of fines may be changing. 
                                                 
48 DSU, art. 22.4. 
49 See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham Intl. L.J. 51, 99-103 (1987).  For a 
general analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott & 
Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2d ed. 1990). 
50 See, e.g., Chile-US FTA, art. 22.15(5); Singapore-US FTA, art. 20.6(5).   - 14 -
 
B. Specific  Proposals 
 
In light of the above-described general considerations, what practical 
improvements might be suggested to improve implementation of WTO dispute settlement 
decisions.  I believe that several changes should be given serious consideration.  In 
particular, I think that the WTO remedies for non-implementation should incorporate (i) 
the possibility of substituting fines or damages as a remedy in lieu of suspension of 
concessions; (ii) some degree of retroactivity, so as to encourage compliance within the 
reasonable period of time; and (iii) some adjustment mechanism to increase the sanctions 
over time, so as to preclude non-compliance from becoming an acceptable status quo 
position.  I discuss each in turn. 
 
1. Money  Payments 
 
Because suspension of concessions has yet to be used as a remedy by any other 
than members of the Quad, I think it is evident that another remedy more meaningful to 
the typical WTO member is needed.  The obvious possibility is to allow a prevailing 
party to choose between suspension of concessions and receipt of a periodic monetary 
payment.  While there may be enforcement problems in that it may difficult to ensure the 
payment is made, the right to receive a payment will still be more valuable than the 
never-used and probably unusable right to suspend concessions.  As noted above, there 
are some signs that payments of fines or damages may be gaining in acceptability, as 
demonstrated by their inclusion in US free trade agreements.  Moreover, the US Congress 
recently authorized around $50 million for the US to use to pay “damages” in trade cases.  
However, to date, it has only appropriated about $3 million for this purpose (for use in 
the US Copyright case).   
 
Perhaps the greatest downside of relying on money payments is enforceability.  
One way to solve the enforceability problem would be to require WTO members to create 
funds from which damages could be paid without specific legislative approval.  This 
should not be all that controversial as it is the way I believe that civil judgments against 
governments are typically paid.  In any event, if a payment is not made when due, there 
would always be the fallback of suspension of concessions. 
 
2. Retrospective  Assessment 
 
As noted above, the prospective nature of WTO remedies currently gives 
countries no incentive to comply promptly and may even encourage foot-dragging.  To 
minimize this problem and to create incentives for prompt compliance, it should be 
provided that any remedy (whether retaliation or money payment) will be calculated from 
a date prior to the date set for implementation (e.g., date of adoption of the relevant report 
or date of panel establishment or even earlier).  Since no remedy would be imposed if 
implementation occurs within the reasonable period of time, there would be an incentive 
to meet that deadline for implementation.   
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3.  Increasing Sanctions Over Time 
 
Increasing sanctions over time would also seem to offer some real possibilities for 
improving implementation.  Such a procedure would help to avoid the perception that the 
payment of fines or damages is simply an alternative to compliance.  In a sense, this 
concept has been used by the EC in the FSC case, where the duty it imposed on a long list 
of US products started at 5% was increased at a rate of 1% each month.  The monthly 
change focused attention on the case each month and the impending increase, even if 
small, created an incentive to act so as to forestall it.  In US congressional debates on the 
FSC implementation legislation, at least some members of Congress have made this point.  
Because of the huge size of the FSC sanctions – $4 billion – a phase-in made practical 
sense in any event.  But the same concept could be used in other cases, so long as it is 
agreed to allow sanctions to increase over time from the initial amount. 
 
C. Concluding  Thoughts 
 
In Part II, the point was made that any solution attempting to address the WTO’s 
implementation problems must deal effectively with (i) the recent US failures to 
implement and to the occasional foot-dragging by the Quad countries (and Australia) and 
(ii) with the particular implementation problems in the areas of subsidies, SPS, 
safeguards and trade remedies. 
 
  In terms of US failures to implement, it is, of course, a hopeful sign that the US 
Congress recently enacted legislation to implement the FSC and 1916 Act decisions.  In 
the latter case, implementation was due to the inclusion by the leadership of a provision 
to repeal the 1916 Act in a conference report where neither the House nor Senate versions 
of the bill at issue contained such a provision.  This suggests some concern on the part of 
the US, including the Congress, not to be seen as ignoring WTO obligations.  In any 
event, to the extent that pressure can be effectively put on the US to implement WTO 
rulings, it would seem to me that the above changes would increase such pressures.  The 
same is true in the case of the other Quad members.  In particular, the adoption of 
questionable implementation measures would be much less likely if a system of 
retrospective remedies was put in place.  Moreover, the provision of increased sanctions 
that would increase the cost over time of non-implementation would clearly provide an 
incentive not to delay implementation.  In the end, of course, WTO remedies may be 
insufficient to influence the behavior of major powers, but the proposed changes in the 
remedy system would seem to be a positive step in the right direction. 
 
  The use of retrospective remedies and increased sanctions over time would likely 
help solve the particular implementation problems that are seen in the subsidy and SPS 
areas.  In each case, the cost of non-compliance would increase and that would help 
offset the political opposition to implementation.  That would not necessarily be the case 
in respect of safeguards and trade remedies.  As outlined above, the assumption of the 
current system (and the proposed changes thereto) is that compliance within the set 
reasonable period of time would absolve a country from suffering the application of any 
remedy.  Yet in the area of safeguards and trade remedies that would still allow a country   - 16 -
to impose the safeguard or trade remedy, enjoy its effect and only be compelled to 
remove it after the WTO dispute settlement procedure had run its course.  Thus, 
questionable safeguards and trade remedies might continue to be imposed and then 
removed after a couple of years of disrupting trade.  It would seem to me that the only 
way to solve this problem would be to require payment of reparations if the imposition of 
such measures are found to be WTO-inconsistent.  I think that these cases are often too 
complex to expect that a system of provisional remedies or accelerated timeframes could 
make much difference.  Since these measures often stop trade and may not result in the 
collection of duties in any event, a rule on refund of duties would also not address the 
problem in general.  Providing for reparations (damages to trade flows) might work.   
However, while reparations are the standard remedy in international law for violations of 
a state’s obligations, importing such a concept into the WTO would probably be viewed 
by WTO members as a more drastic and less acceptable change than the adjustments to 




This introduction has surveyed the current state of implementation of decisions in 
WTO dispute settlement.  While the overall record of implementation is relatively good, 
there are problem areas.  Those problems could be mitigated with the modification of the 
remedies provided for in WTO dispute settlement so that (i) money payments could be 
substituted for the right to suspend concessions, (ii) such payments or suspension of 
concessions could be calculated on a retrospective basis, and (iii) such payments or 
suspension of concessions could be increased periodically over time in the event of 
continued non-implementation. 
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Table 1 – Overall Timeframes – Country-by-Country 
 
Case  Elapsed Time (as of December 
2004 for unimplemented cases) 
Country Medians 
(+ = continuing to increase) 
   
DS2 - US Gasoline   35 months   US Overall                  32 months
DS24 - US Underwear SG  15 months   
DS33 - US Wool Shirts SG  9 months  US General                 36.5 
DS58 - US Shrimp  38 months  US Trade Remedies   34+ 
DS99 - US DRAMS AD  32 months  US Safeguards            21 
DS108 - US FSC  85 (contested)  US TRIPS                   66.5+ 
DS136 - US 1916 AD Act  78 (contested)   
DS138 - US Lead CVD  21 months   
DS160 - US Copyright  72 months (continuing)   
DS165 - US Bananas Retaliation  2 months   
DS166 - US Wheat Gluten SG  27 months   
DS176 - US Section 211  66 months (continuing)   
DS177 - US Lamb Safeguard  28 months   
DS179 - US Stainless AD (K)  26 months   
DS184 - US Steel AD(Japan)  62 months (continuing)   
DS192 - US Cotton Yarn SG  20 months   
DS202 - US Line Pipe  27 months   
DS206 - US Steel AD (India)  28 months   
DS212 - US EC-12 CVD  36 months (contested)   
DS213 - US Steel CVD (Ger)  41 months   
DS217 - US Byrd  49 months (continuing)   
DS248 - US Steel Safeguard  21 months   
DS257 - US Lumber CVD  32 months (contested)   
DS56 - Argentina Textiles  32 months  Argentina      27.5 months 
DS121 - Argentina Footwear  23 months   
DS155 - Argentina Hides  38 months   
DS189 - Argentina Tiles  27 months   
DS238 - Argentina Peaches  28 months   
DS241 - Argentina Poultry  17 months   
DS31 - Canada Periodicals  31 months  Canada          33 months 
DS70/222 - Canada Aircraft  94 months (continuing)   
DS103 - Canada Dairy  68 months   
DS114 - Canada Patents  34 months   
DS139 - Canada Autos  32 months   
DS170 - Canada Patent Term  26 months   
DS26 - EC Hormones  93 months (contested)  EC                46 months 
DS27 - EC Bananas  108 months (settled at 63 months)  
DS69 - EC Poultry  25 months   
DS141 - EC Bed Linen  53 months   
DS219 - EC Malleable Tube  39 months   
DS231 - EC Sardines  27 months   
DS50 - India Patents  34 months  India            44 months 
DS90 - India QR  44 months   
DS146 - India Autos  46 months   
DS8 - Japan Alcohol Taxes  30 months  Japan           30 months 
DS76 - Japan Agricultural Prods  52 months   
DS245 - Japan Apples  28 months (contested)     - 18 -
DS75 - Korea Alcohol Taxes  32 months  Korea          32 months 
DS98 - Korea Dairy  33 months   
DS161 - Korea Beef  31 months   
DS18 - Australia Salmon  55 months  Australia      50.5 months 
DS126 - Australia Leather  46 months   
DS110 - Chile Alcohol Taxes  39 months  Chile            39 months 
DS207 - Chile Price Band  39 months   
DS46 - Brazil Air  103 months (continuing)   
DS211 - Egypt Re-Bar  34 months   
DS60/156 - Guatemala Cement  49 months   
DS54 - Indonesia Autos  33 months   
DS132 - Mexico HFCS  57 months   
DS122 - Thailand H-Beams  43 months   
DS34 - Turkey Textiles  64 months   
   
  OVERALL      34 months 
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United States  Underwear SG  Gasoline   Steel CVD 12  Byrd  23 
  Wool Shirts SG  DRAMS AD  FSC  Copyright    
  Shrimp  Steel CVD (G)  1916 Act  Steel AD (J)    
 Lead  CVD    Lumber CVD Sec. 211    
 Certain  Products        
 Wheat  Gluten  SG        
  Stainless AD (K)         
 Lamb  SG         
 Cotton  Yarn  SG         
 Line  Pipe  SG         
  Steel AD (India)         
 Steel  Safeguard         
Argentina  Footwear Textiles        6 
 Hides         
 Tiles         
 Peaches         
 Poultry         
Canada  Periodicals Dairy      Aircraft  6 
 Patents         
 Autos         
 Patent  Term         
EC  Poultry Bananas    Hormones    6 
 Sardines  Bed  Linen      
 Malleable  Tube         
India  Patents       3 
 QR         
  Autos       
Japan  Alcohol Taxes  Ag Products   Apples     3 
Korea  Alcohol Taxes        3 
 Dairy         
 Beef         
Australia   Salmon        2 
   Auto  Leather         
Chile  Alcohol Taxes        2 
 Price  Band         
Brazil      Aircraft  1 
Egypt  Rebar      1 
Guatemala  Cement       1 
Indonesia  Autos      1 
Mexico   HFCS        1 
Thailand  H-Beams       1 
Turkey   Textiles        1 
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The Quad and Australia 
United States  12 3  (7  months)  4  4 23 
Canada  4  1 (28 months)  -  1  6 
EC  3  2 (28 months)  1  -  6 
Japan  1  1 (20 months)  1  -  3 
Australia  -  2 (16 months)  -  -  2 
  20 (50%)  9 (14.3 months)  6  5  40 
Developing Countries  
Argentina  5 1  (5  months)  - -  6 
India  3 -  - -  3 
Korea  3 -  - -  3 
Chile  2 -  - -  2 
Brazil  - -  - 1  1 
Egypt  1 -  - -  1 
Guatemala  1 -  - -  1 
Indonesia  1  - -  -  1 
Mexico  -  1 (20 months)  -  -  1 
Thailand  1 -  - -  1 
Turkey  - 1  (5  months)  - -  1 
  17 (81%)  3  (10 months)  0  1  21 
  37 (61%)  12 (13.3 months)  6  6  61   - 21 -









(over 4 months) 
Pending dispute  Not 
implemented 
GATT  (16)  US Shrimp  US Gasoline     
  US Certain Prods  Argentina Textiles     
  Argentina Hides  EC Bananas     
  Canada Periodicals  Turkey Textiles     
  Canada Autos        
  Chile Alcohol Taxes       
  India QR       
  India Autos       
  Indonesia Autos       
  Japan Alcohol taxes       
  Korea Alcohol Taxes      
  Korea Beef       
Agriculture  (3)  EC Poultry  Canada Dairy     
  Chile Price Band       
Subsidies  (4)   Australia  Leather  US  FSC  Brazil  Aircraft 
       Canada  Aircraft 
SPS  (4)   Australia  Salmon  EC  Hormones   
    Japan Ag Prods  Japan Apples   
TBT  (1)  EC Sardines       
Trade Remedy (18)  US Stainless  US DRAMS  US Steel-12  US Byrd 
  US Lead-Bismuth   US Steel (Ger)  US 1916 Act  US Steel (Japan)
  US Steel (India)  EC Bed Linen  US Lumber   
 Argentina  Tiles       
 Argentina  Poultry       
 EC  Malleable  Tube       
 Egypt  Rebar       
 Guatemala  Cement       
 Mexico  HFCS       
 Thailand  H-Beams       
Safeguard  (10)  US Underwear       
  US Wool Shirts       
  US Wheat Gluten      
 US  Lamb      
 US  Line  Pipe      
 US  Cotton  Yarn      
 US  Steel      
 Argentina  Footwear      
 Argentina  Peaches      
 Korea  Dairy      
TRIPS  (5)  Canada Patents      US Copyright  
  Canada Patent Term      US Sec. 211 
 India  Patents       
 
 
 
 